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ABSTRACT 
Let a be a social preference function, and let v(a) be the Nakamura 
number of a. If W is a finite set of cardinality at least v(a) then 
it is shown that there exists an acyclic profile P on W such that a(P) 
is cyclic. Any choice function which is compatible with a can then be
manipulated. A similar result holds if W is a manifold (or a subset 
of Euclidean space) with dimension at least v(a) - 1. 
EXISTENCE OF PERMUTATION CYCLES AND MANIPULATION OF CHOICE FUNCTIONS 
Norman Schofield 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that if a is a "non-collegial" social 
preference function on a "universal" set of alternatives, W, then it 
is possible to construct an acyclic profile P on W such that a(P) is 
itself cyclic [1]. However, if W is restricted in some way, by 
cardinality when finite or by dimension when W is a vector space, then 
there may exist no profile P such that a(P) is cyclic. For example, 
consider a q-rule, a, where any coalition with q people is winning. 
Ferejohn and Grether [2] showed that if W is finite of cardinality 
IWI < n � q then a(P) cannot be cyclic when P is itself acyclic. 
Conversely if lwl l n � q then an acyclic profile P can be constructed
such that a(P) is cyclic. A parallel result by Greenberg [4] has 
shown that a core exists for a(P) on a convex set W if and only if the 
dimension of W is no greater than ___JL_• Recently [10, 11, 12, 13) n - q 
Greenberg's theorem has been extended to the case of an arbitrary 
voting rule where the dimension bound of W is given in terms of the 
Nakamura [71 number v(a) of a. The purpose of this paper is to extend 
the Ferejohn-Grether result by showing that lwl < v(a) is necessary 
and sufficient condition for the non-existence of cycles and the 
existence of a core, when W is finite and individual preferences are 
acyclic. Using this result it is shown that when lwl l v(a) then a 
can be manipulated. Using earlier results it is also shown that when 
W is a manifold, or less generally a subset of Euclidean space, of 
dimension at least v(a) - 1 then again a can be manipulated. 
2. STATEMENT OF RESULTS
Throughout the paper we shall use the definitions, notation 
and terminology of [8] to which the reader is referred. We review 
these definitions as follows. 
When P is a binary relation on a set of alternatives, W, then 
we use the notation xPy to mean (x,y) e P. A strict preference P on 
the set, W, is a binary relation on W which is irreflexive (i. e. , xPx 
for no x in W) and asymmetric (i. e. , xPy implies not(yPx) for any x,y 
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in W). A preference, P, is transitive if xPy and yPz implies xPz, for 
any x,y,z s W. A subset Cx1, ••• ,xr} of W is a P-cycle iff
x1Px2 ••• PxrPx1• If P is a preference and W contains some P-cycle 
then P is said to be cyclic on W. If W contains no P-cycle, then P is 
said to be acyclic on W. A profile for a society N = {1, ••• ,i, ••• ,n} 
is a list P = {P1, ••• ,Pn} of strict preferences, one for each member
of the society. Let B(W) represent the class of strict preferences on 
W, and B(W)N the class of profiles on W whose components are strict 
preferences. Similarly let A(W) and A(W)N represent the -0lass of
acyclic strict preferences and acyclic profiles. When Pi e B(W) then
the indifference relation I(Pi) associated with Pi is given by xI(Pi)y
iff neither xPiy nor yPix. Weak preference R(Pi) is defined by 
xR(Pi)y iff not(yPix).
If Pi and Pj are both strict preferences th
en define the meet 
Pi /\ Pj e B(W) by 
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Clearly if xPiy and yPjx then xI(Pi /\ Pj)y where I(Pi /\ Pj) is the 
indifference relation associated with Pi/\ Pj. Moreover, if Pi' Pj 
both belong to A(W) then so does Pi /\ Pj. In this paper the set of 
alternatives, W, will be assumed to be of finite cardinality, lwl = w, 
although an occasion we refer to results when W is a topological 
vector space of dimension dim(W). 
A social preference function (SF) is a function, a ,  which 
assigns to any profile, P, of strict preferences on a set W a strict 
preference, a(P), on W and moreover satisfies the independence axiom 
(see (9, Def. 2,2]). Here we shall principally examine simple social 
preference functions, or voting rules. We call a subset, M, of the 
society, N, a coalition. A coalition, M, is decisive for a SF, a, iff 
for any profile, P, and any alternatives x,y e W 
xPiy for all i e M � xa(P)y. 
Let ID a refer to the class of decisive coalitions for a. If a is such
that xa(P)y � xPiy for all i in some coalition M in ID a' then a is
said to be simple, and is referred to as a voting rule. Suppose that 
for a social preference function, a, there exists M1,M2 8 ID a such
that M1 n M2 = �. It is then possible to construct a profile P such 
that xPiy Vi s M1 and yPix Vi s M2, if x,y e W. In this case we 
obtain xa(P)y and ya(P)x so that a(P) is not asymmetric. We forbid 
this by assuming that a is proper i. e. ,  that M1 n M2 I cp whenever 
M1,M2 s ID a' 
If a is a voting rule whose decisive coalitions are 
ID a {Mc N: IMI l q) then a is called a q-rule. In this case we 
write aq and ID q. For convenience we shall restrict the term q-rule
to those cases where q is integer and n/2 < q � n - 1. An example of 
a q-rule is simple majority rule which is defined by taking q = k + 1 
wherever n is odd and equal to 2k + 1 or n is even and equal to 2k. 
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An important question in social choice is whether an SF, a, is 
acyclic in the sense that a(P) e A(W) for all P s A(W)N and 
appropriate w. If a point x s W belongs to a a(P)-cycle then we shall
say x belongs to the global cycle set GC(a,W,N,P). In the case that W 
is of finite cardinality, then GC(a,W,N,P) is empty only if the core 
(or global optima set) 
GO(a,W,N,P) = {x e W : �y e W st. ya(P)x) 
is non-empty. We shall write GC(a,P) and GO(a,P) for these two sets 
when there is no ambiguity. We also define the pareto set for 
coalition M and profile P by 
GO(M,P) = {x e W : �y e W st. yPix Vi e Ml . Note, of course, that 
GO(a,P) c 0 GO(M,P) 
ID a 
with equality when a is a voting rule. 
Without imposing further restrictions on W or P, a necessary 
condition for a(P) to be acyclic is that ID a be collegial. More 
formally, if ID = £A1, • • •  , Ar} is a class of coalitions then the 
intersection K(ID ) = A1 n . . . n Ar is called the collegium of ID .  ID 
is called collegial or non-collegial depending on whether K(ID ) is 
non-empty or empty. If K(ID a) is non-empty then the SF, a, is called
collegial and the members of K(ID a) are known as vetoers; otherwise a 
is called non-collegial. If W is a set of finite, but arbitrary, 
cardinality and a is a non-collegial SF then it is always possible to 
find an acyclic profile P on W such that a(P) is cyclic [l]. 
Ferejohn and Grether [2] have in a sense refined this result, 
in the case of a q-rule, by showing that the set W of alternatives on 
which a(P) is cyclic must be of sufficiently high cardinality. More 
precisely, for a a q-rule they showed that if W is of finite 
cardinality, lwl, with lwl = w then a(P) a A(W) for all Pa A(W)N iff
q > [w � 1]n. Thus the q-rule, a, is acyclic iff lwl < n � q' In 
other words a(P) is acyclic if lwl < n � q' and an acyclic profile P 
can be found on W whenever lwl L �n� such that a(P) is cyclic. The n - q 
first inequality may also be written lwl { v(n, q) + 1 where v(n,q) is 
the largest integer which is strictly less than ___g__ . n - q 
In a recent paper Greenberg [4] extended this result by 
showing that for a q-rule, a, if W is compact, convex of dimension w, 
and each individual preference is continuous and convex then the core, 
GO(a, P), is non-empty iff q > [w � 1)n. Again this inequality can be
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written dim(W) { v(n,q). Greenberg then gave an alternative proof of 
the Ferejohn-Grether result by embedding a finite set, W, of 
cardinality (w + 1), in the w-dimensional simplex. 
In two recent papers by Schofield [10) and Strnad [13) 
Greenberg's result has been extended to the case of an arbitrary non-
collegial voting rule. More particularly Schofield [10, 11) and 
Strnad [13) independently showed that for any non-collegial rule there 
exists an integer v(a), called the Nakamura number with the following 
property: If W is compact, convex of dimension w, and preferences are 
continuous and convex then the core, GO(a,P) is non-empty iff 
w ! v(a) - 2. It is easy to show [10) that v(a) - 2 = v(n,q), which 
indicates that the Schofield-Strnad result generalizes Greenberg' s 
theorem. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend Greenberg' s procedure 
to obtain a generalization of the Ferejohn-Grether theorem to the case 
of arbitrary voting rule. First of all we define the Nakamura number 
[7J. 
Definition 1: If ID is a family of subsets of N, then the Nakamura 
number v( ID ) of ID is defined as follows: 
(i) if K(ID ) '/ <I> then v(ID ) 
"'· 
(ii) if K(ID ) = <I> then 
v(ID ) = min flID 'I ID ' c ID and K (ID ' ) = d>} • 
If a is a social preference function with decisive coalitions 
ID a' then the Nakamura number, v(a), of a is defined to be v(ID a>.
Since we always assume that a is proper then v(a) l 3. The principal 
theorem of this paper is as follows. 
Theorem 1: Suppose that a is a social preference function and W is a 
set of alternatives with finite cardinality lwl = w. 
(i) if w l v(a) then there exists a profile p e A(W)N such that 
GO(a,P) is empty and GC(a,P) is non-empty 
(ii) if w = v(a) and P e A(W)N such that GC(a,P) is non-empty
then GC(a,P) = GO(N,P) 
(iii) if w ! v(a) - 1 and p e A(W)N and in addition a is a voting 
rule then GC(a,P) is empty and thus GO(a,P) is non-empty. 
As we have noted, when aq is a q-rule, v(aq) = v(n,q) + 2 and this as
a corollary we obtain the Ferejohn-Grether result that aq(P) is
acyclic iff IWI ! v(n,q) + 1. 
While Nakamura [7] introduced the notion of v(a) to obtain a 
7 
version of parts (i) and (iii) of this theorem, the proof offered here 
is intrinsically geometric and constructive and is of some additional 
interest since it sheds some light on the structure of the "top" cycle 
set and on the possibility for coalition manipulation. 
3. EXISTENCE OF CYCLES 
The key to the proof of Theorem 1 is the notion of a 
representation of a. 
First of all for an arbitrary non-collegial family ID of 
coalitions we shall call a subfamily ID ' of ID a Nakamura family iff 
( i) I ID ' I = v( ID ) 
(ii) K(ID ' )  = d> 
(iii) M e ID '  implies that M\{i} i ID for any i e M. 
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It is evident that one can choose at least one Nakamura family for any 
non-collegial family ID .  In a previous paper [12] it has been shown 
that when ID ' is a Nakamura family then there exists a representation 
rJ of ID '  of the following kind. First of all let v(ID ' )  = v(ID) = v 
and let ID ' = {M1, ••• ,Mv} .  Let A be the standard simplex in 
]l v-l 
spanned by the set of vertices Y = fy1, . •• ,yv} • Let 
N(ID ' )  = {i e N : i e M for some M s ID ' } .  A representation rJ is a 
set-set correspondence 
with the 
(i) 
(ii) 
rJ N(ID ' )  �A 
following properties. 
For each Mj e ID' , rJ(Mj) = Fj is the j
th face of A 
"opposite" the vertex yj' 
For each i e N(ID ' )  let IDi = {M e ID : i s M} . 
is the barycenter of the subsimplex n rJ(Mk). Mke ID  i 
Then rJ( {i} )  
For example suppose Mj e ID '  and consider ID"= ID ' \ {Mj} •  Clearly 
IID "I = v - 1 and so K(ID ") -F <I>. Thus there exists an individual whom 
we may label j such that j e K(ID "). By the definition 
rJ((j} ) = 0 rJ(Mk) '  However, the facesID "  
rJ(M1), ••• ,rJ(Mj-l)' rJ(Mj+l), ••• ,rJ(Mv) intersect precisely in the vertex 
yj' opposite Mj and so rJ( {j} ) = Yj• For convenience we call the set 
of individuals V = {1, ••• ,v} the vertex group and note that each 
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individual j e V is matched by <J to precisely the vertex yj of A. For 
any subset Y' of Y = (y1,, , ,, yv), let A(Y') be the subsimplex of A 
spanned by Y' and let 9(A(Y')) be the barycenter of A(Y'), It has 
been shown [12, Lemma 1) that for i s NOD') it is the case that when 
<J((i)) = 9(A(Y')) then the set Y' is characterized by yj e Y' iff
it Mj and Yj e Y\Y' iff i e Mj ' 
Example 1: To illustrate, suppose N = (1, 2, 3, 4, S, 6) and 
ID 
M3 (1, 2, 4, S), M4 = (1, 2, 3, S) and Ms= (2, 3, 4, 6). Obviously 
v(ID) = 4. A Nakamura family is ID' = £M1, Mi, M3, M4J. Note that 
K(ID '\(Mj)) = (j) for j = 1, . .  . , 4 and so the vertex group is 
(1, 2, 3 , 4). Let A be the simplex in JR 3 spanned by the four vertices 
fy1• Y2• Y3•Y4l and define <J((j)) = Yj for j = 1, • • •  , 4. Moreover 
ID S= CM3, M4J = ID  '\(M1J\(M2J and so, following the definition of <J, 
we let <J((S)) be the barycenter of the subsimplex spanned by (y1, y2), 
This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 here] 
See [12] for full details of the construction. 
Proof of Theorem l(i): Let v(a) = v be the Nakamura number for a, and 
let ID ' be a Nakamura family for ID a' By assumption IW I 2. v and so
there exists a subset X = Cx1,, , , , xv) of W. Adopt the convention that 
xt+v = xt for any integer t l O. Let <J be a representation of ID' with 
respect to A in JRv-l, and let Y = fy1, • • •  , yvl be the set of vertices 
of A. For each j = l, . • •  , v  let 
1 -1 <J- ((yj)) = (i e N(lD') : <J((i)) = (yj)) and to each i e <J ((yj)) 
assign the acyclic preference relation Pj on X which is given by
Now consider any subset Y' of Y with IY'I l 2. To any individual
i e N(]D ') with <J((i)) = 9(A(Y')) assign the acyclic preference 
profile /\ P j where the meet is taken over all j such that y j e Y'.j 
Now for each Mj e ID ', we note that 
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Moreover, if i e Mj 
then <J((i)) e A(Yj) and so xj-lPixj. Note that by the convention we 
have adopted x0 • xv and so xvPixl for all i e M1, We have thus 
constructed a profile for the society N(ID ') on X. Extend this 
profile over W in the obvious way by defining xPiy whenever x e X and 
y e  W\X for each j e N(ID '), To each individual i e N\N(ID ') assign 
an arbitrary but acyclic preference relation. Let P be the acyclic 
profile for N on W so constructed. From the construction it is the 
case that for j = 2,,,, , v  we obtain xj-lPixj for all i e Mj' 
Moreover, xvPixl for all i e M1• Since (M1, ,,, , Mv) e IDa we obtain 
Thus a(P) is cyclic. By the construction it is evident that 
GO(a, P) = 4>. 
Q, E. D. 
Example 2: To illustrate the method of proof, consider Example 1 
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again. Suppose that lwl l 4 and let X = {x1,x2,x3,x4l be a subset of 
W. Assign acyclic preferences to the vertex group {1,2,3,4} on X as 
follows. 
x1P1x2P1x3P1x4 
X2P2x3P2x4P2X1 
X3P3x4P3x1P3X2 
X4P4X1P4x2P4X3• 
As we saw we define d({S} )  = 9(A({y1,y2} )) and thus we let 
PS = P1 I\ P2• Hence Ps is given by 
Since x1P1x2 and not (x1P2x2) we may assign an arbitrary preference 
for x1,x2 to individual s. As we expect, for all i e M1 = {2,3,4} we 
obtain x4Pix1• Note also that individual S agrees with the other 
members of M3 that x2 is preferred to x3, and he agrees with the
members of M4 that x3 is preferred to x4• When preferences are
extended over W and individual 6 is allocated an arbitrary preference 
we obtain a cycle 
on X. 
When CJ is a social preference function and ID ' a Nakamura 
subfamily of ID CJ' then a subprofile P for N(ID ') on a set X of v(CJ) 
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alternatives of the kind constructed in the proof of Theorem l(i) we 
may call a ID '-permutation profile or simply a permutation profile for 
CJ. 
Proof of Theorem l(iii) : Suppose that lwl = w { v - 1 where v(CJ) = v 
and CJ is a voting rule. Suppose further that there exists a cycle 
XrCJ (P)x1CJ(P) ••• xr where r { w. Let Mj = {i e N : xj-lPixj} where 
again we adopt the convention that xt = xt+r• Clearly 
ID = {M1, . .  . ,Mr} c ID CJ since CJ is a voting rule. But IID I { v - 1 and 
so K(ID ) = M1 n ... n Mr F <p. Hence there exists i e K (ID ) such that 
Thus contradicts the assumption that Pi s A(W) for all i s N. Thus 
P s A(W)N implies there can exist no CJ(P)-cycle on W.
Proof of Theorem l(ii) : By the third part of Theorem 1, if 
Q,E. D. 
lwl = v(CJ) = v, then there can exist no CJ(P) cycle on a proper subset 
of W. Thus if GC(CJ,P) is non-empty it must be the case that 
GC(CJ,P) = W. Let xvCJ(P)x1 ••• CJ (P)xv• Again for j = l, ••• ,v let
Mj = {i s N xj-lPixj} and let ID '  = {M1, . .  . ,Mv} .  For each 
j = 1, . .  .,v it is the case that IID '\[Mj} I { v(CJ) - 1 and thus 
K(ID '\{Mj} )  F (fl. After relabelling let [j} = K(ID '\ {Mj} )  so that 
xjPjxj+l ••• Pjxj-l' However, the preference for {j 
+ l} satisfies 
all i e N. Hence x j and x j+l are "pareto indifferent. " 
Clearly 
GO(N,P) = W. Since GC(a,P) = W we obtain GO(N,P) = GC(a,P) 
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Q. E. D. 
As a further illustration of the theorem, consider the case 
where a is a q-rule with q = n - 1. Then v(n,n - 1) = n - 2 and so 
v(a) = n. Thus the vertex group V = {1, •••• n} and a permutation
profile is one based on permutations of the preference 
Pixn•
In a previous paper Ferejohn, Grether and McKelvey [3] showed 
that an (n - 1)-rule could be "manipulated" as long as lwl l n - 1. 
In the next section we shall extend their result to the case of a 
general rule. 
4. MANIPULATION OF CHOICE FUNCTIONS 
The existence of a permutation preference profile, of the kind 
constructed in the previous section, essentially means that a 
particular choice mechanism C can be manipulated. 
The general idea is to suppose that the choice procedure is 
implementable in the sense that the outcomes selected by the choice 
procedure result from the individuals in the society selecting 
preference relations to submit to the choice procedure. These 
preference relations need not be "sincere" or truthful, but are in an 
appropriate sense optimal for the individuals in terms of their 
truthful preferences. An "implementable" choice procedure will then 
the monotonic. However, the existence of a permutation profile for a 
means that any choice mechanism which is compatible with the voting 
rule, a, cannot be monotonic and thus cannot be implementable. Full 
details can be found in [3]. Here we briefly outline the proof that 
the existence of a permutation profile means the choice mechanism is 
not monotonic, 
Definition 2: 
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(i) A choice function C is a mechanism which assigns to any set 
W and any preference profile P e A(W)N a non-empty subset
C(W,P) of W. 
(ii) The choice function, C, is compatible with a social 
preference function, a, on W iff C satisfies the following 
property: for any x e W, P e  A(W)N and M e  ID a if it is the 
case that for each i e M there exists no Yi e W with yiPix 
then {x} = C(W,P). 
(iii) The choice function, C, is non-collegial iff C is compatible 
with a non-collegial social preference function, a. In this 
case define the Nakamura number v(C) of C to be v(a). 
(iv) If p e A(W)N then a manipulation P '  of P by a coalition M is 
e A(W)N 
, 
a profile P '  (Pl,••• ,Pn) such that Pi = Pi for 
, 
i t M and pi -F Pi for some i e M.
(v) If x e C(W,P), for P e A(W)N then C is manipulable b� M at 
.{x.J2 iff there exists a manipulation P '  of P by M, with 
{x '} = C(W,P ') for some x• -F x, where x 'Pix for all i e M.
(vi) Say C is non-manipulable if for no x, no Mc N and no 
P s A(W)N is C manipulable by M at (x,P).
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(vii) The choice function C is monotonic on W iff whenever x s W 
and P, P' s A(W)N such that x s C(W,P) and for all i s N and 
all y s W\(x} it is the case that xR(Pi)y implies xR(P�)y
then x s C(W,P'). 
If a choice function C cannot be manipulated then it must be 
monotonic [3]. See also [5, 6], In Theorem 2 we show that if 
lwl l v(C} then it is possible to construct a permutation profile for 
a social preference function, a, for which C is compatible. 
Consequently whatever a choice is made by C then C is manipulable at 
that choice. 
Theorem 2: Let C be a non-collegial choice function on a finite set 
W. If IWI l v(C) then C cannot be monotonic and thus C must be
manipulable. 
Proof: Let a be a social preference function with which C is 
compatible. By definition v(C) = v(a), Since a is non-collegial, 
v(a) < �. Let v = v(a) and let X = (x1, • • •  ,xv} c W. By Theorem 1 
there exists a profile P s A(W)N such that P/X, the profile P 
restricted to X, is a permutation profile for a on X. Moreover, for 
all i e N, all x e X and all y s W\X it is the case that xPiy.
Consider any alternative x e C(W,P), and suppose first of all that 
x = xj e X, say. As in Theorem l(i), there exists a coalition 
Mj s ID a such that each member, i, of Mj has a preference of the form 
(Here Ri stands for weak preference of individual i). Let P' be the 
manipulation of P by M obtained by defining xj-lp�y for all 
Y s W\(xj-l} all i s M, but leaving all other preferences unchanged. 
Since P s A(W)N, this ensures that P' s A(W)N, Moreover, since C is 
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a-compatible, (xj-l} = C(W,P'), Furthermore, since xj-lPixj, for all 
is Mj, C is manipulable at (xj,P). Suppose now that C is monotonic, 
For all i s N it is the case that 
By monotonicity, xj s C(W,P'), But (xj-l} = C(W,P'), Hence C cannot 
be monotonic. In similar fashion, if x s W\X, then C is manipulable 
by each coalition M1, • • • •  My at (x,P). Again C cannot be monotonic. 
Thus there exists some Ms ID a such that C is manipulable by M. 
Corollary 1: If W is finite with lwl l n and n l 3 then for no
O. E. D. 
monotonic choice function C, does there exist a non-collegial voting 
rule a, such that C is compatible with a. 
Proof: For any non-collegial voting rule, a, it is the case that 
v(a) ( n [10]. Thus if IWI l n and C is compatible with a non-
collegial voting rule a, then by Theorem 2, C must be non-monotonic 
and hence manipulable. 
O. E. D. 
Ferejohn, Grether and McKelvey [3] essentially obtained 
Theorem 2 in the case that a was a q-rule with q = n - 1. In this 
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case they said that a choice function that was compatible with a was 
minimally democratic. They then showed that a minimally democratic 
choice function could be neither monotonic nor implementable (or non-
manipulable) whenever IWI' l n.
Example 3: Let P be the permutation preference profile on W 
constructed in Example 2. Let C be a choice function compatible with 
a, and suppose, for purposes of illustration that x4 s C(W,p). Note 
that each member of the coalition M4 = {1,2,3,5} prefers x3 to x4• 
Let P' be the manipulation by M4 of P which is given by
I I 
f f I 
X3P2X2P2X4P2Xl 
I I I 
X3P2X4P3X1P3X2 
let P4 = P4 and P6 = p6, Since M4 = {1,2,3,S} s IDa• {x3} = C(W,P'). 
In identical fashion, whichever alternative is selected by the choice 
function, one of the four decisive coalitions may manipulate P to its 
advantage. 
Consider the case with majority rule with n = 4. In this case 
the Nakamura number is 4. However, all other majority rules have 
Nakamura number 3. Thus majoritarian rules are essentially 
manipulable even with three alternatives. Peleg [8] has previously 
shown that if a is a q-rule then there exists a non-manipulableq 
choice function C compatible with aq on W iff q > [
w 
� 
1]n where 
w = IWI. We use Theorem 2 to extend Peleg's result to an arbitrary 
voting rule. 
Corollary 2: If a is a proper and non-collegial voting rule as a 
finite set of alternatives, W, with Nakamura number v(a) then there 
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exists a non-manipulable choice function C which is compatible with a 
iff lwl f v(a) - 1. 
Proof: The necessity of the constraint lwl f v(a) - 1 follows from 
Theorem 2. To show sufficiency define the mechanism Ca by 
GO(a,W,N,P). 
Clearly Ca is compatible with a. Moreover, by Theorem 1, if 
lwl ! v(a) - 1 then GO(W,P) �<I> for all P s A(W)N and so Ca is a 
choice function. Then by Peleg's method of proof [8, Theo. 4.3] Ca is 
non-manipulable. 
Q, E, D. 
In the earlier paper [12] it was shown that if W is a convex 
subset of :mW of dimension at least v(a) - 1 then it is always 
possible to construct an acyclic profile P of convex preferences on W 
such that the core GO(a,P) is empty and GC(a,P) is non-empty. An easy 
extension of that result can be used to show that the profile P has 
the following property: there exists a subset X = Cx1, • . •  ,xv} of 
alternatives in W such that P, when restricted to X, is a permutation 
profile for a Nakamura subfamily of ID a. Indeed since the argument is 
"local" the argument is valid when W is a smooth manifold [12, Cor. 
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1]. Conversely, if dim(W) ! v(a) - 2 then for convex preferences the
optima set must be non-empty [11] and "local" permutation cycles 
cannot exist [10]. We may therefore state the following without 
proof. 
Corollary 3: Let a be a non-collegial voting rule. If W is a smooth 
manifold of dimension dim(W) l v(a) - 1 then there exists no a­
compatible non-manipulable choice function on W. On the other hand if 
W is a compact, convex subset of lRw with w ! v(a) - 2 then there
exists a choice function C, defined on the set of all convex profiles 
on W, such that C is a-compatible and non-manipulable. 
Since v(a) = 3 generally for majority rule it is the case that 
when the "policy space" W is a manifold of dimension at least two then 
essentially no choice function can be non-manipulable and compatible 
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Figure 1: The representation in 1113 of a voting rule with 
Nakamura number equal to four. 
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